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We show that the disclosure of information about a government’s conduct affects the
types of candidates who stand for election. Our empirical test focuses on Brazilian city
council elections in 2004 and 2008. The identification strategy exploits the random-
ness of the timing of the release of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by
local governments. We observe that when the audit finds low levels of corruption (i.e.,
when it represents a positive popularity shock), the parties supporting the incumbent se-
lect less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick, on average, more-educated
candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption (i.e., when it represents a
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1. Introduction
Electoral accountability is a crucial mechanism that helps guarantee the sustainability
of modern democracies. It allows sufficiently informed voters to assess the government’s
performance and hold politicians accountable for their actions (Barro, 1973; Mayhew,
1974). An extensive empirical literature shows that voters reduce their support of parties
and officials involved in political scandals (Ashworth, 2012; Ferraz and Finan, 2008;
Snyder and Hirano, 2012; Chong et al., 2015; Costas-Pérez et al., 2012) and reward
politicians who are perceived to perform better (Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2016).
In this paper, we follow up on these findings and account for the possibility that
political parties might anticipate voters’ punishment, or reward, and change the com-
position of the pool of candidates selected to run for office accordingly. Specifically, we
show that the release of information about government corruption affects the quality of
candidates of the incumbent coalition. Intuitively, one might expect that if a political
party (or coalition of parties) supports a government that faces a negative popularity
shock, it might react by selecting more appealing and competent candidates to com-
pensate for the expected poor results in the following election. If there is a positive
popularity shock, one might expect the party to behave strategically by reducing the
share of costly, high-ability candidates given that the election will be less competitive.1
Symmetrical intuitions could hold for the decisions made by the parties supporting oppo-
sition candidates. These ideas are closely related to a recent strand of literature showing
that political parties are strategic players that take into account specific features of the
electoral competition when making decisions (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi
and Merlo, 2015).2
We address this issue in the Brazilian context by looking at the effect of popular-
ity shocks resulting from the disclosure of reports about potential misconduct in local
1We follow recent studies by considering education level as a proxy for politicians’ ability. See, for
example, Ferraz and Finan (2009), Galasso and Nannicini (2011), Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013),
Besley et al. (2011) or Daniele and Geys (2015).
2In general, voters like high-ability politicians, but the lack of incentives might limit the number
of good citizens who choose to enter politics (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Messner and Polborn, 2004).
Similarly, parties benefit from the selection of low-ability politicians, for example when low-ability
candidates provide higher rents for the party or/and have a lower reservation wage (Besley, 2005; Dal Bó
et al., 2006). However, parties might select better candidates when an election is more competitive in
order to maximize their chances of winning (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015).
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governments on the ability of candidates for city councilor in the 2004 and 2008 local
elections. Hence, we relate the education level of candidates from the coalition support-
ing (or opposing) the incumbent government with the release of information about its
(dis)honesty. This information was made available to voters through an anti-corruption
program introduced in 2003 by the Brazilian central government that monitors how mu-
nicipalities spend federal funds. The primary task is performed by auditors who examine
municipalities’ accounts to verify the correct use of federal transfers.
Municipalities are randomly selected into the anti-corruption program, and the tim-
ing of the release of the report is also random. These characteristics are crucial for our
identification strategy, as they help to assess the multi-faceted endogeneity issue of link-
ing government conduct and the general quality of local politicians. Another important
aspect for our purposes is that the process of selecting candidates for the city council has
a similar schedule in all Brazilian municipalities. This makes it possible to define when,
during the term, the selection process is taking place. Further, although city councilors
are elected using an open-list proportional system, parties play a central role in selecting
candidates. In practice, a citizen is eligible to stand for election if he has been affiliated
with the supporting party for at least 12 months before election day. Formally, the
candidate list is decided during party conventions that, by law, are held in June of each
election year. This list must be submitted at least 3 months before election day.
We exploit the randomness of the timing of corruption disclosures and, conditioning
on the level of corruption, compare the ability of the pool of candidates in municipalities
where the audits were released during the candidate selection period (i.e., from 12 to 3
months before the election) with that of municipalities in which the audits were released
either before or after the selection period.3
Our findings, which are based on 1,321 municipalities that were audited in the period
2003–2010, show that when reports are disclosed during the political selection period,
they lead to a significant change in the average ability of the candidates running for the
city council who belong to the party (or coalition) of the incumbent mayor.4 This effect
crucially depends on the level of corruption reported. Indeed, the spread of information
3It is worth noting that our identification strategy closely follows the one used in Ferraz and Finan
(2008), however, given the different research question, our definition of treatment and the way we split
the sample between treated and control municipalities are rather different.
4We reach a similar conclusion when studying mayoral candidates, though with less statistical power.
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about government conduct can provide either a positive or negative shock to the expected
electoral results, depending on citizens’ prior beliefs about the quality of the government
(Besley, 2007). On the one hand, we find that there is a decrease in the candidates’
average education of nearly 4.5 months of schooling when low levels of corruption are
reported (i.e., lower than the median). On the other hand, we find an increase of nearly
4 months of schooling when substantial corruption is reported (i.e., higher than the
median). In other words, there is a difference of 8.5 months of schooling depending on
the results of the audit, which corresponds to about 30–35% of one standard deviation.
These symmetric results are not surprising in a context where trust in politics is very
low, and releasing information about the absence of corruption could be more unexpected
than the opposite.5 The effect is of a similar magnitude when considering the sample of
freshmen candidates or when we look at the median level of education. Interestingly, the
effect is larger when we constrain our analysis to municipalities that have easier access
to information due to the existence of local radio stations. However, we do not find any
change in other observable characteristics such as age and gender. Moreover, we show
that the closer the release of the audit report is to the election, the higher the ability of
the candidates selected, regardless of the level of corruption detected. Finally, we find
that changing the composition of the candidate pool does not have a significant effect on
electoral outcomes. In fact, voters still punish corrupt parties, in particular where local
radio stations are available, and the elected candidates do not appear to have different
characteristics compared to those elected in municipalities where the report was released
outside the selection period.
To our knowledge, we are the first to estimate the effect of popularity shocks about
the incumbent government on the quality of political candidates. Our finding is closely
related to the recent literature that emphasizes that the characteristics of the electoral
race affect candidate selection. This could be because of a change in either individuals’
incentives to enter politics or parties’ incentives to select particular types of candidates
(Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Galasso and Nannicini, 2011). Our results are more in line
with studies that emphasize the role of the demand for politicians (i.e., party selection)
than those that focus on the supply of politicians (i.e., self-selection of individuals).
5Brazilians have very low confidence in political parties. More than 85% of the individuals interviewed
in the 6th wave of the World Values Survey (2010–2014) responded that they have little or no confidence
at all in political parties.
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For instance, Galasso and Nannicini (2011) focus on the role of parties in the selection
of candidates. Studying the Italian parliamentarian elections, they show that better
candidates (i.e., those with more years of schooling) are selected in districts where the
electoral race is expected to be more competitive. Mattozzi and Merlo (2015) further
show that the incentives to select high-ability candidates crucially depend on the electoral
system. Specifically, high-ability candidates are less likely to be chosen in proportional
than in majoritarian systems, as the latter are characterized by a higher level of electoral
competitiveness. Likewise, Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012), studying Senate and House
elections in Spain, find that parties tend to select female candidates where they are less
likely to be elected.
Further, we complement the literature on political scandals. For instance, Ferraz and
Finan (2008) focus on random audits in Brazilian municipalities to show that publicly
exposed corrupt incumbents are less likely to be re-elected in the next election. In addi-
tion, Snyder and Hirano (2012) show that in US House elections, incumbents involved in
scandals have a higher probability of losing their primary elections, and receive less votes
in general elections compared to non-scandal incumbents. Chong et al. (2015) show that
voters punish both incumbents and challengers after receiving information about the
inefficient use of public funds in Mexico.
Our results also contribute to the recent literature on the consequences of Brazil’s
randomized auditing policy. While Litschig and Zamboni (2013) show that increasing
the audit risk reduces rent extraction in public procurement, Ferraz and Finan (2008),
Brollo et al. (2013) and Muço (2016) confirm that the release of the audit reports indeed
has an effect on electoral outcomes.6 Interestingly, Brollo et al. (2013) hint that auditing
policy affects political selection: they show that the disclosure of the reports affects not
only the mayor’s likelihood of re-election but also the probability that he or she will
run for re-election. Muço (2016) finds that municipal audits influence federal elections.
Voters also reduce their support for the party of the incumbent mayor when voting in
presidential elections. This result emphasizes that party labels matter in Brazil, despite
being recognized as a weak party system.7
6These results are relevant to our study, as they provide additional support to the critical assumption
that auditing disclosure affects voters’ decisions.
7Samuels and Zucco (2014) reach a similar conclusion as they find Brazilians conform their opinions
on public policy to those of the parties they support.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting. In
Sections 3 and 4, we present the data and estimation strategy, respectively. The main
results and additional tests are reported in Sections 5 and 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2. Institutional setting
2.1. Local institutions
Brazil is a federation with three levels of government. In addition to the federal gov-
ernment, there are 26 states and 5,565 municipalities. Citizens choose the executive and
the legislative branches of each jurisdiction through direct elections. Local governments
have a central role in the provision of a variety of public goods (e.g., primary education,
culture, health care, housing, transportation and municipal infrastructure). Transfers
from upper levels of government cover a significant proportion of these expenditures.
At the municipal level, the mayor (Prefeito) has executive power while the city council
(Câmara de Vereadores) exercises legislative power. The number of seats for councilors in
each city council is based on population size.8 Mayors and city councilors are both elected
for a term of 4 years, but while mayors are limited to two terms, city councilors have no
term limits. The mayor plays a central role in defining the expenditure programs, and
the city council is responsible for enacting municipality laws and overseeing the mayor’s
usage of public resources. Indeed, councilors have influence over the allocation of funds,
for instance by proposing petitions, amendments and voting on the municipal budget
proposal.
2.2. Electoral rules and the candidate selection process
In municipal elections, voters are provided with a list of candidates running for mayor,
at most one for each party (or coalition of parties), and a list of candidates for city
councilor indicating which party they support.9 Voters can cast one vote for mayor
and one vote for councilor. Alternatively, voters can select a party in the city council
election without specifying a candidate. While mayors are elected with a majority of
8Local laws define the exact number of seats, but they have to follow federal laws that set the limit of
seats according to the population in the municipality (Art. 29 of 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution.).
The number of seats ranges from a minimum of 9 in municipalities with less than fifteen thousand
inhabitants, and a maximum of 55 in those with more than eight million people.
9Municipal elections are held in different years than federal and state elections.
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votes, councilor elections use an open-list proportional system, and the distribution of
seats follows the d’Hondt method. This means that the number of seats assigned to
a party in the city council depends on how many votes all candidates from that party
received. However, for each party, only the candidates with the most votes will become
city councilors.
Importantly for our study, political parties play a significant role in selecting candi-
dates to run in local elections. Only parties that have been registered with the Tribunal
Superior Eleitoral (TSE) within one year of the elections can present candidates. Almost
30 different parties presented candidates in the 2004 and 2008 elections. However, the
five biggest parties accounted for more than 65% of all mayors elected in the 2004 and
2008 elections. A similar time constraint applies to citizens who want to register to run
in the mayoral or city councilor elections. They need to have their voting residency in
the district they would like to represent and to be affiliated with their supporting polit-
ical party for at least one year before the election. The electoral law requires parties to
nominate candidates during local conventions, but it does not define how these conven-
tions need to be organized or how candidates should be selected. Although conventions
are usually open to all party affiliates, party activists who belong to the municipal di-
rectorate and professional politicians have a strong influence on the selection process
(Mainwaring, 1999).
In the 2004 and 2008 municipal elections10, parties had to choose their candidates and
coalitions in a party caucus from June 10–30 of the election year. Final candidate lists
had to be registered with the TSE before July 5.11 The maximum number of candidates
a coalition can put forward is twice the total number of seats it holds in the city council.12
The parties must put forward a minimum of 30% female candidates.
10These elections were held on October 3, 2004 and October 5, 2008
11Changes to the electoral law (Law No. 9504, of 30 September 1997) in 2015 affected some of the
elements we exploit in our analysis. Beginning with the 2016 municipal elections: (1) party conventions
are required to take place from July 20 to August 5 in election years; (2) candidate lists must be
submitted by August 14 and (3) candidates must be affiliated with a political party for at least 6
months before election day.
12If a party is not in a coalition, the number of candidates cannot be more than 150% of the total
number of seats it holds in the city council. Further, if not all candidates are selected during the party
convention, party leaders may fill the remaining vacancies within 60 days of the election.
7
2.3. The Brazilian anti-corruption program
In 2003, the Brazilian national government, led by Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, es-
tablished an innovative anti-corruption program to improve the transparency of public
spending and to tackle corruption in local governments. The Controladoria Geral da
União (CGU), a federal agency, was made responsible for auditing local spending that
has been funded with federal transfers.13 Importantly for our analysis, municipalities are
randomly selected to the auditing process. Lotteries are held every two or three months
in the Caixa Econômica Federal, in Brasília, in the presence of the media and members
of civil society. Only municipalities with more than 500,000 inhabitants are exempt from
the lottery. Further, since lotteries are run independently for each state, the probability
of being selected for an audit in a given year varies by state. The first lottery selected
26 municipalities. From the second lottery to the eighth, 50 municipalities were selected
each time; 60 municipalities have been chosen since the ninth lottery.
For each selected municipality the CGU compiles a list of all federal transfers received
since 2001. Typically, 10 to 15 auditors spend around two weeks in the municipal offices
searching for potential anomalies. Once the auditors have completed the inspections,
they prepare a report listing any irregularities and malpractices. The report is then
sent to competent authorities for prosecution and made publicly available on the CGU
website about 3 months later. As shown by Ferraz and Finan (2008), the results of the
audits generally receive media attention, especially at the local level.
3. Data
To estimate the effect of corruption disclosure on the quality of the pool of candidates,
we collect information about Brazilian municipalities from a variety of sources for the
period 2001–2010, which covers two full municipal terms (i.e., 2001–2004 and 2005–
2008).14
Information about municipal-level corruption is taken from Brollo et al. (2013). Their
data contain different measures of corruption for all 1,481 municipalities selected in the
first 29 lotteries of the anti-corruption program (i.e., audits disclosed from July 2003 to
March 2010). We use a broad definition of corruption that includes also irregularities
that could be interpreted as government mismanagement rather than true corruption
13CGU Decree No. 247, June 20, 2003.
14Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables described below.
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events.15 This definition includes illegal procurement practices and the diversion of
funds – not justifiable payments.16 To account for the different levels of corruption
across municipalities, our analysis uses the variable Corruption, which represents the
amount of misappropriated funds as a proportion of the total amount audited.17 This
information is available for only 1,422 municipalities, as it was not possible to compute
the amount of resources involved in some irregularities. The level of observation is the
municipality-term, meaning that we can clearly identify the term during which electoral
irregularities took place. In other words, if a municipality was selected in a lottery in
2007, it will likely appear in the sample twice, as the auditors checked spending that
occurred in both the 2001–2004 term and the first part of the 2005–2008 term.
We use candidates’ level of education as a proxy for quality. Specifically, we consider
the minimum number of years necessary to attain a certain degree.18 Alternatively, we
use the share of candidates that completed Mandatory School. The TSE provides data
on the level of education of candidates for the city council. For each municipality, we
distinguish between the Average Education level of candidates in the incumbent’s and
the challengers’ coalitions. The incumbent’s coalition includes candidates from all the
parties that run in the same coalition as the incumbent mayor’s party and who belonged
to the winning coalition in the previous municipal election.19 The challengers’ coalition
includes candidates running for all other parties. Further, we compute the same variable
considering new candidates (i.e., those who were not city councilors in the previous
term). We also take into account the Median Education level of candidates and two
other characteristics relevant for political selection – the Share of Female candidates
15Therefore, in our analysis we do not distinguish between active and passive waste (Bandiera et al.,
2009), as we rely on the fact that both types of misbehaviours might be salient for electoral account-
ability.
16The dataset and full details on how the measure is constructed are available at https://sites.
google.com/site/fernandabrollo/home/data.
17In the original dataset this variable is called Broad Fraction of the Amount. Note that we do not
consider a binary measure of corruption as in the Brazilian context, the presence of corruption might
not be informative per se, conversely we exploit the severity of the phenomenon. See Section 1 and the
footnote 5.
18For candidates who started a degree but eventually dropped out, we assign half the number of years
that would be needed to complete it.
19We also show in Appendix Table A.3 our main results by defining the incumbent coalition as
composed of all parties that belonged to the winning coalition in the previous municipal election.
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and Average Age. We also construct the two latter variables and the Average Education
level for the sample of elected candidates.
We compute similar measures for mayoral candidates, but focus only on candidates
belonging to the same party as the incumbent. Finally, we consider the Share of Seats
Won by candidates elected from the incumbent’s coalition.
We control for local political preferences by creating a dummy variable that equals 1
if the incumbent government was led by a mayor from Partido dos Trabalhadores, and
0 otherwise. This variable also controls for whether the municipalities is ruled by the
same party in power at the federal government. The 2000 Brazilian Census provides
data about the Population of the municipality, monthly per capita Income, Share of
Population Employed, the Gini Coefficient of income, the Share of population with a
Secondary Degree, the Share of Population in Urban areas, the share of population
working in different job sectors (Services, Transport, Public and Commerce). We also
construct a dummy variableMedia, which accounts for the presence of local radio stations
in the municipal area. This information is taken from the 2006 municipality survey Perfil
dos Municípios Brasileiros: Cultura.
To provide homogeneous results in all our estimates, we apply a sequence of re-
strictions to the original dataset on corruption provided by Brollo et al. (2013). First,
we remove eight municipalities, as they did not yet exist in 2000 when the population
census was conducted. Second, we consider only municipalities in which at least some
parties support the incumbent’s coalition. Therefore, we remove 88 more municipalities.
Finally, we exclude five municipalities in which there were no new candidates for city
councilor (i.e., they were all incumbents). Clearly, by applying these restrictions the
sample of municipalities we use in our analysis is no longer random. We address this
issue in Section 6.
4. Estimation strategy
The main objective of this study is to test whether information shocks that change
citizens’ voting behavior affect the quality of electoral candidates selected by parties.
Specifically, we want to compare (1) the ability of candidates running for city council
when the local government experiences an informative shock during the party selection
period to (2) the ability of candidates running for city council in local governments that
experience a similar informative shock at other points in time. In order to provide a
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reliable counterfactual analysis, we exploit the randomness of the timing of the disclosure
of the audit reports to determine the group of Treated vs. Control municipalities.
To precisely determine the selection period (and hence the composition) of the two
different groups, we identify two important dates in the electoral process. First, we
account for the deadline for parties to provide their candidate lists (i.e., July 5, 2004
for the elections held in October 2004 and July 5, 2008 for the October 2008 elections).
Second, we consider the cutoff date for citizens to be affiliated with a party in order to
run as a candidate for that party (i.e., October 3, 2003 for the October 2004 elections
and October 5, 2007 for the elections held in October 2008). Thus, a municipality is
considered to be treated if the disclosure of the report occurred between 12 to 3 months
before election day. We think our definition makes clear that the focus on parties’ role
in the selection process as the group of citizens willing to run for public office is mostly
predetermined by the time the reports are disclosed. Indeed, depending on the lottery
results, the communication of the audit reports might occur during, before or after what
we identify as the treatment period. It is worth noting that our strategy closely follows
the one used in Ferraz and Finan (2008). However, as we are exploring a distinct research
question, our definition of treatment and the way we split the sample between treated
and control municipalities are rather different. Indeed, Ferraz and Finan (2008) define
treated municipalities as those that received an auditing disclosure anytime before the
election.
Another aspect to take into account is that auditing reports reveal a misuse of public
funds that could cover both terms we include in our analysis. This could be a problem
if it were not possible to determine the exact timing of the misbehavior. In this were
the case, citizens would be limited in their judgment as it would be less clear who was
accountable for the discoveries made during the audit. Luckily, the corruption data we
use categorize the misuse of public funds by term and municipality, which allows us to
identify the treated and control groups for each term as reported in Figure 1.
Table 2 summarizes the sample composition, differentiating between treated and
control municipalities depending on the electoral term. Over the two terms, we have
1,695 observations: 327 are treated (19.3% of the sample) and 1,368 are controls (80.7%
of the sample). We have 182 treated and 960 control municipalities for the 2001–2004
term. Here, the treated municipalities are the ones drawn from the four lotteries disclosed
between October 2003 and April 2004, while the control group includes all municipalities
selected in the other 25 lotteries that had audit reports released in the 2001–2004 term.
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For the 2005–2008 term we have 145 treated and 408 control municipalities. The
treated municipalities were drawn from the three lotteries disclosed between January
2008 and June 2008, while the control group comprises all municipalities selected from
the six lotteries disclosed between February 2006 and July 2007 plus the four lotteries
disclosed between December 2008 and March 2010 that were audited for federal funds
released in the 2005–2008 term.20 Finally, 374 municipalities appear in the sample twice,
as they are part of the control group for the first term and part of either the control or
treated group in the second term.21
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the two groups of municipalities. Indeed,
although our sample is a sub-sample of those selected within the randomized lotteries, it
seems well balanced. Only the share of the population working in the industrial sector
is different between the two groups at the 5% significance level. Note that including this
variable in our specifications does not affect our findings.
Formally, we start the analysis by estimating the following ordinary least squares
(OLS) model:
Yist = β Tist + δXi + γs + λt + ist, (1)
where i denotes the municipality, s the state and t the term. Yist can be the Average
Year of Schooling of either all or freshmen candidates for city councilor, from either
the incumbent or the challenger coalition. Tist is a dummy taking a value of 1 for
municipalities with audit reports released during the selection period (i.e., from 12 to
3 months before the election), while Xi is a set of time-invariant municipal controls.
Finally, γs are state-fixed effects, λt are term-fixed effects and is is the error term. We
use an OLS model with standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
Thanks to the random assignment of the auditing among municipalities, the coef-
ficient β is the causal parameter of interest. In other words, it represents the average
effect of the release of the auditing reports on candidates’ education levels. State-fixed
20The reports disclosed before February 2006 did not account for funds released in the 2005–2008
term.
21Municipalities that were audited more than once appear in our sample only with reference to the
first draw. In this way, we avoid the possibility that the potential long-term effects of the audit would
bias our estimates (Avis et al., 2016).
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effects are included in all specifications, since the random assignment was stratified at
the state level. Therefore, we ensure that our identification accounts for the heteroge-
neous probability of selection on the treatment faced by municipalities from different
states. In addition, term-fixed effects account for other unobservable characteristics that
might have changed from one term to the next. We include municipal controls in order
to provide more precise estimates in case the randomization still produces a selection of
treated and controlled municipalities with unbalanced characteristics.
We expect the estimates from Equation (1) to produce significant results if the audit-
ing disclosure per se matters in the candidate selection process, regardless of the actual
information provided. However, this would only be the case if the information disclosed
differs from what the voters or parties expect (Ferraz and Finan, 2008) – i.e., if there is
a systematic under- or over-estimation of a municipality’s level of corruption.
Therefore, we refine our baseline analysis by taking into account the results of the
auditing process. We produce different estimations to test whether the effect of the
disclosure on the selection of candidates depends on the kind of information reported.
Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
Yist = β1 Tist × Corruptionist + β2 Tist + β3 Corruptionist + δXi + γs + λt + ist, (2)
where Corruptionist is the share of corrupted resources. Moreover, to provide more
flexible estimations and to account for potential non-linearity of the effects, we interact
T with a variable identifying municipalities that belong to different quartiles of the
distribution of corruption. In other words, we compare the effect of the disclosure of
different levels of corruption on the level of education of the pool of candidates. This is
a crucial point because, depending on the level of corruption revealed, the information
shock could send either a positive or negative message to citizens. However, using this
approach could raise important issues if our measure of corruption simply serves as a
proxy for other municipal conditions. We check for this possibility in Section 6.
5. Results
5.1. Baseline analysis
In this section, we report our central results. Specifically, Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 4 show the results from the estimates of Equation (1), in which the dependent
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variable measures the level of education of all candidates in the incumbent’s coalition.
As expected, the disclosure of reports per se has no direct effect on candidates’ qual-
ity. Moreover, the inclusion of municipal covariates does not seem to have a sizable
impact on the main coefficient, which is in line with a balanced sample thanks to the
randomization of the treatment. The remaining columns of Table 4 report estimates of
Equation (2). Columns (3) to (5) report the effect of the auditing, interacted with the
level of corruption, on the education of all candidates selected by the incumbent coali-
tion’s parties. Column (3) provides the first indication that reporting high corruption
boosts the quality of candidates put forward by the incumbent’s party. The interaction
term has a positive sign, but it is not statistically significantly different from 0. Column
(4) reports the estimate where the treatment status variable interacts with a dummy
that identifies whether a municipality is in the top 50th percentile of the distribution
of our measure of corruption.22 This result, coherently with Column (3), suggests that
when the audit report is disclosed during the selection period, in municipalities with low
levels of corruption candidates from the incumbent’s coalition have around 4.5 months
less of schooling (coeff. -0.378). However, if high levels of corruption are exposed, we
observe an increase in the average education of slightly more than 4 months of schooling
(coeff. 0.724-0.378 = 0.346). Both coefficients are statistically significant. Therefore,
there are more than 8.5 months of education difference depending on the signal provided
by the audit. This difference corresponds to about 30–35% of one standard deviation.
The coefficients in Column (5) indicate the quartile of corruption and emphasize that
22The level of corruption in the median municipality was 0.5%.
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the effect is stronger with higher levels of reported corruption.23 The last three columns
suggest similar results once the focus is only on new candidates (i.e., those who were
not previously on the city council). This is a crucial finding, as using new candidates
rules out the possibility that the estimates rely on a mechanical effect coming from the
direct consequences of the audit (e.g., if the audit led to the incarceration of involved
councilors who were mostly low-ability individuals).24
Table 5 shows that the challenging coalition, which is not directly accountable for
the outcome of the audit, does not change the education levels of its pool of candidates:
the coefficients of interest are not statistically significant in any of the regressions.25
Thus, our main result points to the effect of information on shaping the selection of
political candidates as parties do react to the expected electoral shocks. On the one hand,
they increase the quality of candidates in municipalities where elections become more
difficult (i.e., where a severe report has been released). This is in line with previous
research showing that parties select better candidates when they need them, namely
during more competitive elections (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and Merlo,
2015). This intuition is supported by other studies showing that educated individuals
are more likely to be elected (Dal Bó et al., 2016). Within our sample, individual
candidates’ level of education is also strongly positively correlated with the number of
23The results are similar if we only use as control those municipalities that have the auditing disclosure
after the selection period. Appendix Table A.2 includes an alternative measure of schooling as a depen-
dent variable – the share of candidates that completed Mandatory School. Our findings are confirmed.
Specifically, the share of candidates that completed mandatory school decreases by 4.3 percentage points
where low levels of corruption are found, and increases by about 3.5 percentage points with levels of
corruption above the median. Additionally, Appendix Table A.3 provides the results of changing the
definition of the incumbent’s coalition to include all parties that supported the mayor in the previous
election, regardless of whether they do so in the following election. The results are similar, though
the positive effect on the education of candidates running for office in highly corrupt municipalities is
smaller than the one found with our standard definition of incumbent’s coalition. This does not change
if we consider the extended sample which includes all the 1396 municipalities where there is at least one
candidate representing the old incumbent’s coalition. Finally, in Appendix Table A.1, we show that our
results are mainly driven by the candidates’ selection for the 2004 elections.
24Moreover, there is no supportive evidence of the fact that the audits leaded to an increase in the
incarceration of local politicians.
25This may be because the challenging party expects the incumbent to react to the shock, and therefore
has no incentive to change its own pool of candidates.
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votes they receive (and with their probability of being elected).26 On the other hand,
elections become less risky when the local government experiences a positive shock, such
as reporting no or little corruption. In this case, parties might decide to reduce the
number of high-ability individuals if they are costly. For example, this is possible if
the party shares rents with selected candidates, and this rent is higher the lower the
public motivation (Besley, 2007), or if the party has to supplement candidates’ salaries,
as high-ability individuals have a higher reservation wage (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008).
Although we believe our results can likely be explained by parties’ strategic behaviors,
we cannot rule out the possibility that they are also influenced by changes in the supply
of politicians (i.e., the pool of individuals willing to run for office). This potential effect
is already partially reduced because our treated municipalities cannot select individuals
who are external to the party. In other words, the sample of individuals from which
candidates can be chosen is pre-determined with respect to the treatment. Still, even
within this sample of individuals, an effect could be expected. However, in principle,
citizen–candidate models would predict results that are opposite to our findings (Caselli
and Morelli, 2004; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). For instance, one might expect high-
ability individuals to have even lower incentives to enter politics after a political scandal.
Similarly, it is hard to explain why high-ability candidates would refuse to stand for
election in a municipality that appears to have a functioning administration where it
would be easier to be elected. Therefore, the effect of the disclosure of the audit report on
individuals’ willingness to enter politics will, if anything, adjust the size of our coefficients
downward.
Below, we propose additional analyses that complement the previous findings. We
only report results that focus on parties that support the incumbent, as we have already
shown the absence of effects for the challengers.
5.2. Additional analysis
5.2.1. Alternative dependent variables
We first check whether the effect of the disclosure on candidates’ average level of
education was driven by a general increase (or decrease) in the quality of the pool of
26This correlation holds when controlling for other individual characteristics, as well as city-fixed
effects. On average, an additional year of education significantly increases by 8% the number of votes
received by a candidate. Results are available upon request.
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candidates or whether it came from the selection of a few very good (or bad) candidates.
Therefore, in Columns (1) and (5) of Table 6 we estimate Equation (2) by using the
median level of education of candidates for city councilor as a dependent variable. The
estimates reveal that the median level of education is also significantly affected, in the
same direction as in the main analysis. In particular, the disclosure of a positive report
decreases the level of median education by 5 months (coeff -0.431), while it increases by
3 months (coeff 0.690-0.431=0.259) when the report is negative. The point estimates are
similar when looking at freshmen candidates. This is consistent with a general change
in the composition of the pool of candidates.
Second, we replicate the principal analysis looking at the education of mayoral can-
didates. Therefore, the regression reported in Column (2) of Table 6 considers only
municipalities in which the party of the incumbent mayor decided to present a candidate
(either the incumbent mayor or a new candidate) in the next election. In Column (6)
we focus on the sub-sample of new candidates. The main coefficients are not statisti-
cally significantly different from 0, but their direction is consistent with the results for
candidates for city councilors.27 The insignificant effect could be driven by two charac-
teristics of the mayoral race that make the statistical test weaker. First, there is low
variability in the pool of candidates from one term to the next, as many mayors can
run for re-election. This is not an issue if we look at the results in Column (6), which
pertain to new candidates. Indeed, the effects are larger than those reported in Column
(2) for incumbent mayors. The second characteristic that could be driving the insignifi-
cant effect is the limited variability in the level of education of mayoral candidates: they
are usually highly educated, particularly compared to the general population and city
councilors (see Table 1).
Finally, we explore the possibility that the disclosure might also affect other candidate
characteristics – namely age and gender, which have been analyzed in previous studies on
political selection (Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Daniele and Geys, 2015; Paola et al.,
2010). We consider the average age of candidates and the share of female candidates
as dependent variables. Our findings, reported in Columns (3 and 7) and (4 and 8) of
Table 6, do not highlight any substantial change concerning these characteristics.
27Recall that for mayor, instead of looking at the coalition, we focus on party affiliation.
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5.2.2. Timing of the disclosure
In this section, we test the heterogeneity of the effect of the disclosure depending on
when it occurred to determine whether the effect was mainly due to municipalities in
which the audit report was released close to the end of the selection process. However, it
could also be that audits released earlier have the strongest effect because the incumbent
would have longer to change the selection of candidates.
For this analysis we estimate the following regression separately for the sub-samples
of municipalities with high and low corruption:
Yist =
τ=3∑
τ=1
βτ Tist × 1(t = τ) + δXi + γs + λt + ist, (3)
where Tist interacts with a set of dummies for each trimester of the treatment period.
We report the results of these estimates in Figure 2. In the top panel we display point
estimates and (95%) confidence intervals from a regression limited to the sample of
municipalities in which audit reports revealed high levels of corruption, while in the
bottom panel the analysis is constrained to municipalities with low levels of corruption
reported in their audit. While all coefficients are borderline insignificant, we can draw
two interesting implications. First, the difference between the point estimates from the
two groups of municipalities remains relatively stable over time. Second, the level of
education of the selected candidates is higher the closer to the election the report is
disclosed. This is true regardless of the report’s severity. Thus, for instance, auditing
disclosures that took place from 3 months to 1 month before the candidate list deadline
had no effect on education when they revealed low levels of corruption, but had a large
positive effect in municipalities with high levels of corruption.
5.2.3. Electoral results and local media
The mass media are the main channel through which citizens are informed about
politicians’ behavior. Indeed, the effect of a popularity shock on the electoral results
varies depending on the availability and accessibility of sources of information (Ferraz and
Finan, 2008; Costas-Pérez et al., 2012). If the results shown so far come from parties that
act in anticipation of the potential impact of the audit report on the electoral results, we
should also find that parties’ reactions depend on the presence of local media. Therefore,
we expect audit reports to have a greater effect on the quality of candidates where citizens
have easier access to information. To test this hypothesis, we follow Ferraz and Finan
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(2008) and account for the presence of local radio stations to characterize the different
degrees of media penetration across municipalities. Therefore, we provide estimates
by separately considering (1) municipalities that have at least one local AM/FM radio
station and (2) municipalities with no local radio stations. It is worth highlighting that
media presence in a given municipality is not randomly assigned, thus the following
results are not intended to establish causal relationships.
Initially, we look at the impact of the audit reports on electoral outcomes. It is
important to emphasize that this analysis adds to previous findings about the effect of
the Brazilian auditing policy on electoral results since, to our knowledge, we are the first
to examine how the disclosure of corruption might also effect city council elections.28
Hence, we replicate the baseline model using the Share of Seats won by the incumbent’s
coalition as a dependent variable. We first study the whole sample and then split it
depending on whether municipalities have local radio stations. The results are reported
in Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 7. The coefficients of interest are only significant
when looking at municipalities where citizens have greater access to information. On
the one hand, Column (2) shows that in municipalities where the disclosure of a positive
report occurs during the selection period, the parties supporting the incumbent mayor
win 5% more seats, while if the report is negative they win 5% fewer seats.29 On the
other hand, Columns (1) and (3) suggest that, on average (and in the absence of a
media presence) audits have very little effect on the electoral results. We can draw three
important implications from these results. First, we can confirm that local media play an
essential role in the accountability process. Second, the publication of the audit reports
has a real effect on the election. This is a crucial element as in order for parties to react
to the results of the audit report, they have to expect that voters care enough about the
contents of the report to change how they vote. Third, voters still punish corrupt parties
in elections even if they could select better candidates. Indeed, the electoral reward of a
positive report is not affected by a potential decrease in the quality of candidates.
28Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that corrupt mayors have a lower probability of being re-elected,
while Muço (2016) finds that voters also reduce their support of a corrupt incumbent mayor’s party in
presidential elections.
29If we replicate this analysis and add to our treated municipalities those in which the report is
disclosed between the end of the selection period and election day, we have slightly different results.
While the punishment for having a negative report is significant and of a similar magnitude, there is no
electoral reward associated with receiving a positive report.
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We then apply the same procedure to our baseline estimation. In Column (4) we
report the same results as Column (4) from Table 4, while Columns (5) and (6) report
the results for the samples of municipalities with and without local radio, respectively. In
municipalities with radio stations, when the disclosure of the report provides a positive
signal (i.e., low corruption) there is a decrease in the average years of schooling of all
candidates of a bit less than 7 months (coeff. -0.582), while there is an increase in
education of 3 months when the report provides a negative signal (coeff. 0.845-0.582 =
0.263). The coefficients are of a similar size when we consider either all candidates or
only new candidates (Column 2). When we focus on municipalities with no local radio
stations, Columns (3) and (4), the effect is either not significant or borderline significant.
The reported coefficients are also smaller.
Overall, the results seem to be coherent with our intuition, as the effect of the audit
report appears to be larger, and statistically significantly different from 0 at the 1% level,
only in municipalities where citizens are likely to be more exposed to the media (i.e.,
those with local radio stations).30 Interestingly, the substantial change in the quality of
the pool of candidates does not seem to be enough to significantly change the electoral
results.31
5.2.4. Elected candidates
As outlined above, city councilors are elected using an open-list proportional system,
and citizens still have a say over who will eventually be chosen. In this last section we
analyze whether the disclosure of the report, affecting candidates’ selection, has also
an effect on the elected candidates. This may happen because selecting more- (or less-
) educated candidates could lead to more- (or less-) educated elected politicians (see
footnote 26). To do so, we use the usual specification and consider the average years of
schooling of candidates who were elected from the incumbent coalition as a dependent
variable. We also provide alternative results that examine the share of females and the
30We apply the same strategy by replicating the estimates in Table 6. The main findings do not seem
to be dependent on the presence of the media, except if the dependent variable is the median level of
education; in that case, similarly to the results of this section, the effect appears to be more pronounced
where local radio stations are available.
31Also note that our main findings do not vary depending on the level of electoral competitiveness,
i.e., the change in candidates’ ability is not significantly higher in close elections (results available upon
request).
20
average age of the elected candidates. We report the estimated coefficients in Table 8.
The main coefficients in all three columns are not significantly different from 0, though
the signs of the first column are in line with the once from the main analysis. These
results, together with the fact that voters punish parties that support the incumbent in
the election, despite the changes in the candidates’ selection, are consistent with recent
studies providing evidence that voters do not seem to be affected by parties’ reactions
to popularity shocks (Adam, 2012).32
6. Identification checks
6.1. Sample selection
In our analysis we always constrain the sample to municipalities in which the incum-
bent’s coalition decides to run for election. In other words, our sample is not random.
This might produce a self-selection bias if the disclosure of the audit report affects the
stability of the coalition and hence the decision to run for office. To account for this
potential issue, we test whether there is any difference in the probability of being part
of our sample between municipalities in which the auditing report was disclosed dur-
ing the selection period (i.e., the treated group) or at other times (i.e., the control
group). Therefore, we take the sample provided by Brollo et al. (2013), which includes
all municipalities selected in the first 29 lotteries. From this larger sample we keep the
municipalities used so far in the paper as well as those that were only excluded from the
analysis because the incumbent party did not present any candidates. We then create a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality was part of our sample, and 0 otherwise.
We replicate the same procedure for the sample used in the mayoral election analysis.
The whole sample would be composed of 1,858 municipality-term observations, which
excludes only 163 observations from the analysis. We report in Table 9 the formal test of
the potential presence of self-selection bias, including a number of t-tests showing that
being treated does not affect the average probability of being part of our sample. This
is also true when we look separately at the samples with high and low levels corruption.
In conclusion, this analysis suggests that a coalition’s decision to run for re-election is
uncorrelated with the treatment, and that this is true for different levels of corruption.
32It is worth to emphasize that these results are not meant to be a direct test on whether voters prefer
either high or low educated candidates.
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6.2. Robustness of the corruption measure
Another potential concern about our identification is that our corruption measure
may be serving as a proxy for other municipal features. In fact, while municipalities are
randomly assigned to either a treated or control group, the level of corruption is not
random and might depend on specific municipal conditions. For instance, corruption
is potentially higher where there is extensive use of public investments, which usually
occurs in bigger and richer cities. If this is true, we may be estimating how the release
of an audit (regardless of its severity) has a differential effect on candidates’ education,
for example in small vs. big or poor vs. rich cities. To help assess this potential
issue, we replicate our baseline estimations and include additional interaction terms,
where we multiply the treatment status dummy by a set of covariates that could be
expected to be correlated with the level of corruption: Population, Income, Education
and Share of Pop. in Public Administration. The results, presented in Table 10, reduce
our concerns: in all the estimates, the interaction between the treatment status variable
and the level of corruption is always significantly different from 0 and the coefficient
is relatively stable across the different specifications. Moreover, the interaction terms
that include the covariates never reach the conventional level of significance, whether
analyzed in separate estimations (Columns 1 to 4) or jointly (Column 5).33 Overall, this
suggests that our measure of corruption is unlikely to be proxying for other municipal
characteristics.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides some of the first evidence on the effect of information about
government behavior on the selection of political candidates. Using city council election
data from Brazil, we find that an unexpected positive shock regarding the government’s
honesty has a detrimental effect on the quality of candidates put forward by its coalition
in the next election. By contrast, it selects better candidates when there is a negative
shock. Indeed, we show that these effects are present whether we use the average or
median years of candidates’ schooling. Importantly, the results of our analysis are of
similar size when focusing only on freshmen candidates. Our findings also show that the
accessibility of information plays a role, as our results are clearer in municipalities that
33We find similar results when the interaction term instead uses a dummy for the top 50% percentile
or dummies for the different quartiles.
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have radio stations. However, other candidate characteristics, such as the share of female
candidates and the average age of the pool of candidates, are not affected. We also find
that, despite the changes in the quality of candidates, neither the electoral results nor
the types of elected representatives seem to be significantly affected.
Overall, our analysis first provides one of the few causal estimates supporting the pre-
dictions of recent studies showing that political parties react to specific characteristics of
electoral competition (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015). Second,
we show that information releases might have indirect effects on electoral outcomes. In
light of our results, it could be plausible that studies showing a change in support for
the incumbent after a popularity shock might underestimate the shock’s pure effect on
voters’ preferences, as their voting decisions might also have been affected by changes to
the quality of the pool of candidates. Finally, we find that the Brazilian policy analyzed
in this study does not help improve the quality of elected politicians. On the contrary, in
the absence of corruption we observe that the incumbent party selects lower-ability can-
didates. This puzzling result highlights a potential unintended effect of anti-corruption
measures on the dynamics of political accountability.
23
Term 01-04
Term 05-08
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
C T C
T CC
Figure 1: Treated and control definition
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Figure 2: Timing of the release - High and low corruption sub samples
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Average education - n. of years (incumbent) 9.938 2.186 1 17 1695
Average education - n. of years (challenger) 9.805 1.675 3.571 14.258 1695
Average education of freshmen - n. of years (incumbent) 9.919 2.331 1 17 1695
Average education of freshmen - n. of years (challenger) 9.734 1.687 3 14.3 1695
Mandatory school (incumbent) 0.678 0.231 0 1 1695
Mandatory school of freshmen (incumbent) 0.679 0.247 0 1 1695
Median education - n. of years (incumbent) 9.882 2.891 1 17 1695
Average age (incumbent) 43.542 4.092 23.5 59 1694
Share of female (incumbent) 0.211 0.133 0 1 1695
Median education of freshmen - n. of years (incumbent) 9.822 3.058 1 17 1695
Average age of freshmen (incumbent) 42.871 4.662 22 67 1694
Share of female of freshmen (incumbent) 0.237 0.166 0 1 1695
Average education elected - n. of years (incumbent) 10.472 3.007 1 17 1540
Average age elected (incumbent) 42.964 6.348 22 69 1540
Share of female elected (incumbent) 0.132 0.212 0 1 1540
Mayor average education - n. of years (incumbent) 13.257 4.013 1 17 1195
Mayor average education freshmen - n. of years (incumbent) 13.206 4.015 1 17 663
Share of seats won (incumbent) 0.330 0.196 0 1 1695
Corruption 0.048 0.1 0 0.905 1695
Media 0.431 0.495 0 1 1695
Dummy party incumbent PT 0.212 0.409 0 1 1695
Population 25936.923 48667.258 795 461534 1695
Income 580.174 317.944 80.967 3062.481 1695
Share of pop. employed 37.641 8.202 11.499 75.59 1695
Gini coefficient 0.560 0.068 0.344 0.796 1695
Municipality average education 3.552 1.088 0.746 7.711 1695
Share of pop. in public administration 2.126 1.202 0.122 9.147 1695
Share of pop. in agriculture 16.467 9.856 0.041 64.043 1695
Share of pop. in industry 3.952 3.69 0 34.637 1695
Share of pop. in service 6.675 2.763 0.257 18.756 1695
Share of pop. in commerce 7.535 3.848 0.26 27.764 1695
Share of pop. in transport 1.167 0.695 0 5.593 1695
Share of pop. in service 6.675 2.763 0.257 18.756 1695
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Table 2: Sample details
Term 2001 Term 2005 Total
Treated 182 145 (101) 327
Control 960 (374) 408 (273) 1368
All sample 1142 553 1695
Notes: The table reports details on the sample of 1321 municipalities
considered in our analysis. The level of observation is municipality-term.
In parenthesis we report the numbers of municipalities that appear in
more than one term.
Table 3: Differences in observable characteristics
Control group Treated group Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Average education in t− 1 (incumbent) 9.324 9.348 -0.024
Average education in t− 1 (challenger) 9.262 9.165 0.097
Dummy party incumbent PT 0.215 0.202 0.013
Population 26516 23511 3004
Income 581.668 573.920 7.749
Share of pop. employed 37.720 37.313 0.408
Gini coefficient 0.560 0.558 0.002
Avg. municipal number of years of education 3.568 3.483 0.085
Share of pop. in public administration 2.088 2.196 -0.108
Share of pop. in agriculture 16.390 16.792 -0.403
Share of pop. in industry 4.038 3.592 0.446**
Share of pop. in service 6.705 6.551 0.154
Share of pop. in commerce 7.584 7.327 0.257
Share of pop. in transport 1.175 1.137 0.038
Share of pop. in service 6.705 6.551 0.154
Notes: This table displays the mean characteristics of 1321 municipalities (1695 municipality-term observa-
tions) that were audited by the Controladoria Geral da União (CGU) in the period 2003-2009 (i.e., from the
2nd to the 29th lottery ). The control group (column 1) is composed by 994 municipalities which had disclosed
the results of the auditing concerning the term 2001-2004 either before the 5th of Oct 2003 or after the 5th
of Jul 2004, or had disclosed the results of the auditing concerning the term 2005-2008 after the 5th of Jul
2008 or before the 3rd of Oct 2007. Instead, the treated group (column 2) is composed by 327 municipalities
which had disclosed the results of the auditing from 12 to 3 months before the elections (i.e., from one year
before elections to the 5th of July 2004 or 2008). Column (3) shows the difference of the means and the level
of significance. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Audit releases and the quality of candidates - incumbent coalition
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing 0.016 0.041 -0.073 -0.378** -0.429** -0.160 -0.448** -0.531**
(0.134) (0.115) (0.131) (0.172) (0.194) (0.141) (0.191) (0.212)
Pre-selection auditing × 1.567 1.796*
corruption (0.993) (1.080)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.724*** 0.723***
above median corruption (0.235) (0.258)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.281 0.448
second quartile of corruption (0.393) (0.459)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.629** 0.691**
third quartile of corruption (0.315) (0.333)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.899*** 0.906***
fourth quartile of corruption (0.280) (0.314)
Corruption 0.297 0.377
(0.452) (0.496)
Above median corruption -0.017 -0.004
(0.097) (0.109)
Second quartile -0.005 0.139
(0.202) (0.207)
Third quartile 0.002 0.040
(0.115) (0.132)
Fourth quartile -0.036 0.005
(0.126) (0.143)
F-test inter 0.181 0.012 0.078 0.142 0.025 0.107
R2 0.117 0.374 0.376 0.379 0.379 0.319 0.320 0.322
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates - as a city councilor - from the incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of
the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, gini
coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population working
in industry share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population working in service and share of population
working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Audit releases and the quality of candidates - challenger coalitions
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing -0.043 -0.012 0.014 -0.034 -0.048 -0.026 -0.091 -0.114
(0.095) (0.075) (0.088) (0.112) (0.125) (0.090) (0.118) (0.133)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.452 -0.602
corruption (0.886) (0.845)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.038 0.052
above median corruption (0.150) (0.156)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.075 0.138
second quartile of corruption (0.266) (0.277)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.174 0.220
third quartile of corruption (0.191) (0.200)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.058 -0.054
fourth quartile of corruption (0.185) (0.193)
Corruption 0.246 0.309
(0.283) (0.297)
Above median corruption 0.010 0.013
(0.068) (0.069)
Second quartile 0.077 0.005
(0.127) (0.125)
Third quartile -0.017 -0.036
(0.084) (0.086)
Fourth quartile 0.067 0.069
(0.086) (0.088)
F-test inter 0.839 0.983 0.932 0.618 0.846 0.857
R2 0.172 0.515 0.515 0.515 0.515 0.499 0.499 0.500
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates - as a city councilor - from the challenger coalitions. Corruption is the
share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population),
income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share
of population working in industry, share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population working in
service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
29
Table 6: Audit releases and candidates’ characteristics
All candidates New candidates
Median edu. Mayor edu. Female Age Median edu. Mayor edu. Female Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing -0.431* -0.415 -0.012 -0.239 -0.474* -0.615 -0.021 -0.250
(0.225) (0.687) (0.013) (0.377) (0.253) (0.687) (0.015) (0.426)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.690** 0.309 0.010 0.449 0.600* 0.434 0.010 0.558
above median corruption (0.316) (0.594) (0.017) (0.508) (0.346) (0.852) (0.020) (0.566)
Above median corruption -0.018 0.177 -0.008 0.035 0.058 -0.023 -0.009 0.117
(0.137) (0.256) (0.007) (0.218) (0.151) (0.339) (0.009) (0.252)
F-test inter 0.125 0.646 0.578 0.765 0.173 0.821 0.309 0.563
R2 0.301 0.138 0.065 0.143 0.267 0.151 0.053 0.139
N observations 1695 1195 1695 1694 1695 663 1695 1694
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is median years of education in Columns (1) and (5) , mayor cand. avg. number of years of education in Columns (2) and (6) Share of female
in Columns (3) and (7), average age in columns (4) and (8). Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls
include: dummy party incumbent PT, population, income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population
working in agriculture, share of population working in industry, share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population working
in service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p <
0.01.
Table 7: Audit releases, electoral results and the quality of candidates by media presence
Share of seats won Education of candidates
All Local Radio No Local Radio All Local Radio No Local Radio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-selection auditing 0.011 0.053** -0.019 -0.378** -0.582*** -0.275
(0.018) (0.026) (0.025) (0.172) (0.182) (0.266)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.031 -0.110*** 0.024 0.724*** 0.845*** 0.578*
above median corruption (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) (0.235) (0.304) (0.340)
Above median corruption 0.008 0.013 0.008 -0.017 -0.055 0.029
(0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.097) (0.134) (0.141)
F-test inter 0.520 0.006 0.707 0.012 0.006 0.240
R2 0.146 0.188 0.134 0.379 0.427 0.289
N observations 1695 730 965 1695 730 965
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Share of seats won by the incumbent coalition in columns (1-3) and Average years of education of candidates - as a city councilor
- from the incumbent coalition in columns (4-6). Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls
include: dummy party incumbent PT, population, income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of
population working in agriculture, share of population working in industry, share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share
of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Audit releases and elected candidates
Education Age Female
(1) (2)
Pre-selection auditing -0.102 -1.031* 0.018
(0.263) (0.609) (0.020)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.064 0.866 -0.030
above median corruption (0.351) (0.818) (0.028)
Above median corruption 0.033 0.082 0.010
(0.160) (0.367) (0.013)
F-test inter 0.965 0.342 0.696
R2 0.256 0.086 0.047
N observations 1540 1540 1540
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is average years of education of elected candidates in
column (1), average age of elected candidates in column (2) and share of female of the
elected candidates in column (3). Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited
budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party in-
cumbent PT, population, income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary
degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share
of population working in industry share of population working in commerce, share of
population working in transport, share of population working in service and share of
population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the mu-
nicipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Sample selection
Control group Treated group Difference
(1) (2) (3)
All
Re-run city council (inc) 0.911 0.919 -0.008
Re-run mayor all (inc) 0.648 0.621 0.028
Re-run mayor new (inc) 0.362 0.334 0.028
High corruption
Re-run city council (inc) 0.890 0.913 -0.023
Re-run mayor all (inc) 0.670 0.649 0.021
Re-run mayor new (inc) 0.367 0.351 0.016
Low corruption
Re-run city council (inc) 0.930 0.919 0.004
Re-run mayor all (inc) 0.626 0.601 0.025
Re-run mayor new (inc) 0.356 0.322 0.034
Notes: This table reports differences between the control (1502 observations) and
the treated (356 observations) group about the mean probability of being part of the
sample of municipalities we use in the different sections of the paper. * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 10: Robustness of the corruption measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-selection auditing -0.227 -0.686** -0.969* -0.318 0.128
(0.870) (0.291) (0.499) (0.265) (1.014)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.725*** 0.781*** 0.798*** 0.716*** 0.806***
above median corruption (0.234) (0.239) (0.248) (0.236) (0.246)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.016 -0.108
ln(population) (0.087) (0.100)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.000 0.000
income (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.157 0.130
education (0.110) (0.161)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.025 -0.081
pop. in pub. administration (0.077) (0.083)
Above median corruption -0.017 -0.025 -0.026 -0.016 -0.029
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
F-test inter 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.002
R2 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.380
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the average years of education of candidates - as a city councilor - from the incumbent
coalitions. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of
population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of
population working in industry share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share
of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered
at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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A. Appendix
Table A.1: Audit releases and the quality of candidates by electoral term
Term 2001-2004 Term 2005-2008
Incumbent Challenger Incumbent Challenger
All New All New All New All New
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing -0.612*** -0.711*** -0.088 -0.148 0.157 0.112 0.052 -0.007
(0.227) (0.256) (0.152) (0.162) (0.254) (0.275) (0.148) (0.153)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.783** 0.819** 0.153 0.175 0.331 0.280 -0.197 -0.202
above median corruption (0.304) (0.339) (0.204) (0.212) (0.368) (0.405) (0.213) (0.219)
Above median corruption 0.007 0.030 -0.040 -0.074 -0.213 -0.164 0.111 0.183
(0.115) (0.127) (0.081) (0.083) (0.182) (0.209) (0.119) (0.120)
F-test inter 0.032 0.028 0.891 0.721 0.237 0.546 0.718 0.337
R2 0.389 0.332 0.518 0.496 0.375 0.321 0.515 0.508
N observations 1142 1142 1142 1142 553 553 553 553
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates as a city councilor. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget
involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, population, income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a
secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population working in industry, share of population
working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working in the public
administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.2: Audit releases and the quality of candidates (mandatory school)
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing 0.000 0.002 -0.007 -0.043** -0.053** -0.018 -0.054** -0.060**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.016) (0.023) (0.026)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.124 0.189
corruption (0.107) (0.119)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.078*** 0.086***
above median corruption (0.027) (0.029)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.056 0.035
second quartile of corruption (0.045) (0.053)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.071** 0.080**
third quartile of corruption (0.034) (0.035)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.102*** 0.102***
fourth quartile of corruption (0.034) (0.037)
Corruption 0.036 0.048
(0.052) (0.057)
Above median corruption -0.003 0.000
(0.011) (0.012)
Second quartile -0.015 0.005
(0.021) (0.022)
Third quartile -0.001 0.003
(0.013) (0.015)
Fourth quartile -0.010 -0.000
(0.015) (0.016)
F-test inter 0.320 0.023 0.146 0.123 0.016 0.155
R2 0.111 0.286 0.288 0.291 0.292 0.251 0.253 0.254
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Share of candidates which finished mandatory school - as a city councilor - from the incumbent coalition. Corruption is the
share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income,
gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population
working in industry share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population working in service and share of
population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Audit releases and the quality of candidates - old incumbent coalition
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing -0.102 -0.083 -0.169 -0.323** -0.358** -0.182* -0.370*** -0.402***
(0.112) (0.093) (0.105) (0.137) (0.154) (0.106) (0.139) (0.155)
Pre-selection auditing × 1.224 1.311
corruption (0.878) (0.905)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.414** 0.482**
above median corruption (0.187) (0.189)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.179 0.164
second quartile of corruption (0.320) (0.334)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.253 0.319
third quartile of corruption (0.245) (0.247)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.622*** 0.686***
fourth quartile of corruption (0.229) (0.231)
Corruption 0.097 0.009
(0.409) (0.416)
Above median corruption -0.006 -0.028
(0.086) (0.086)
Second quartile 0.092 0.080
(0.171) (0.172)
Third quartile 0.058 0.038
(0.104) (0.103)
Fourth quartile -0.040 -0.066
(0.110) (0.111)
F-test inter 0.279 0.073 0.190 0.278 0.037 0.124
R2 0.126 0.419 0.420 0.421 0.422 0.417 0.418 0.419
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates - as a city councilor - from the old incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share
of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, gini
coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population working
in industry share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population working in service and share of population
working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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